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Abstract 
This short paper focuses on the response to the pandemic in corporate law and capital 
markets regulation and the role that the law played in it. 
First, the pandemic has brought the interests of stakeholders into more direct focus in 
corporate governance than was previously the case. But questions remain as to whether this 
represents only a temporary adjustment in response to the crisis or, alternatively, a more 
enduring trend. And if the latter, it prompts consideration of the appropriate techniques for 
stakeholder engagement and participation in corporate governance. 
Second, the pandemic has disrupted the relationship between financial firms and their 
customers and the operation of capital markets. Conduct regulators have responded with a 
series of interventions. We examine whether those interventions are ad hoc or, alternatively, 
if they can be linked to key regulatory trends that emerged in the wake of the 2008 global 
financial crisis. This approach provides a basis for assessing the implications of the pandemic 
for the future trajectory of conduct regulation.  
Conclusions are then drawn on the way forward and the likely role that the law will play. 
 
1. Introduction 
The Covid-19 pandemic has prompted a wide range of responses from governments, central 
banks and regulatory agencies around the world as well as driving adaptations to corporate 
governance practices to cope with the new situation. In this paper, derived from contributions 
to a webinar1 hosted by the universities of Edinburgh and Glasgow on 12 June, we focus on 
the response in the UK. Specifically, we focus on stakeholder interests in board decision-
making and regulatory interventions in the framework of conduct of business regulation 
applicable to licensed financial firms. We observe two distinct trends within the responses. 
The first, evident in board decision-making, has been adaptation of practice and focus within 
the scope of the law to elevate the significance of stakeholder interests. The context for that 
outcome is a legal regime for directors’ duties which permits a spectrum of practice linked to 
a rule that consideration must be given to stakeholder interests. The second trend, evident in 
 
1 See https://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/law/research/groups/corporate-and-
financial/news/headline_727032_en.html. This paper is based on two presentations: Iain MacNeil, 
‘Conduct of Business Regulation: Past, Present and Future’; and Irene-marie Esser, ‘The Position of 
Stakeholders during a time of Crisis: The New Normal?’. 
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the case of conduct of business regulation for capital markets, has been a series of 
interventions that are not based on formal legal powers. The context for that outcome is a 
system of regulation in which principles and guidance facilitates intervention by the regulator 
without reference to formal rule-making powers. The outcome in both instances is that 
significant change has occurred without changes to legal rules, albeit there are some other 
examples of interventions where that has been the case.2 We first discuss the two responses 
and then attempt to evaluate their longer-term significance.  
 
2. Within Law – Stakeholder Interests in Board Decision Making 
2.1 Context  
Globally, and in the UK, there have been ongoing debates about the position of stakeholders 
and to what extent their interests should be considered during board decision-making. In the 
UK the duty of a director to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members 
as a whole, but with reference to other factors embedding some form of stakeholder protection, 
is codified in section 172, Companies Act 2006. Even so, the UK corporate governance system 
is one characterised by shareholder primacy and the shareholders are the ultimate 
beneficiaries of directors’ duties.3 The consideration of non-shareholders’ interests is of 
secondary importance and is subordinated to the interests of shareholders – confirming the 
supremacy of shareholders’ interests. Stakeholders have some protection through disclosure 
and reporting requirements and the latest Corporate Governance Code (CGC)4 makes 
provision for various stakeholder engagement mechanisms.5 It is well-known that s 172 
attracted, and still attracts, a lot of criticism mainly as it does not adequately provide for some 
form of stakeholder protection.6 It is pertinent to note that consideration of other factors (as 
 
2 In particular, changes to  insolvency law permitting a new form of debt moratorium and changes to 
corporate law to facilitate online meetings of shareholders – see  the Corporate Insolvency and 
Governance Bill 2019-21 at https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2019-
21/corporateinsolvencyandgovernance.html. 
3 David Cabrelli and Irene-marie Esser, Chapter 12 in Mathias M. Siems and David A. Cabrelli, 
Comparative Company Law: A Case-Based Approach (2nd edn, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2018).  
4 See https://www.frc.org.uk/directors/corporate-governance-and-stewardship/uk-corporate-
governance-code. 
5 Based on Provision 5 of the 2018 UK Corporate Governance Code the board will be obliged to 
understand the views of the company’s other key stakeholders and describe in the annual report how 
their interests and the matters set out in s 172 have been considered in board discussions and decision-
making 
6 See, for example, Elaine Lynch, ‘Section 172: A Ground-breaking Reform of Director’s Duties, or the 
Emperor’s New Clothes?’ 33(7) Company Lawyer 196, 202 (2012), Andrew Keay, ‘Moving Towards 
Stakeholderism? Enlightened Shareholder Value, Constituency Statutes and More: Much Ado About 
Little?’ 22 (1) European Business Law Review 1, 33-36 (2011). See also a short blogpost by Martin 
Petrin, ‘Is Stakeholderism bad for stakeholders? Some Counterarguments’ at 
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/05/21/is-stakeholderism-bad-for-stakeholders/. 
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listed in s 172) is even more problematic, since the appropriate scheme for analysing these 
factors has neither been established nor considered in any detail by the courts.7 
 
In the context of the role of stakeholders, the consideration of ESG issues and sustainability, 
typical questions and issues usually relate to whether or not directors should have a legal duty 
to consider the interests of stakeholders alongside those of shareholders. If so, how would 
they balance the various, competing interests, bearing in mind that stakeholders’ interests are 
not always aligned? A related issue is whether reporting and disclosure requirements 
represent an effective strategy for engaging stakeholders in the decision-making process of 
boards of directors. Reporting and disclosure are usually seen as effective ways to provide 
stakeholders with information, but this is often after decisions have been taken.8 Stakeholders 
can only really get involved in decision-making through some structured form of stakeholder 
participation or engagement. That could be in the form of hard law or soft law, the UK CGC 
being the primary example of soft law. We have previously argued that disclosure plays a 
crucial role, but on its own it is not enough to improve stakeholder participation. For 
stakeholders to be fully engaged they need adequate information, in the form of disclosure, 
but they also need mechanisms to facilitate participation from their side. 
 
The role of stakeholders has been on the corporate governance agenda for a long time. During 
2019 181 CEO’s signed a new ‘Statement on the Purpose of the Corporation’ making five 
commitments to stakeholders.9 Whether this adds anything new is debateable, but it does 
show, at least, reflection and engagement with the topic. It was also one of three issues 
considered during the latest UK corporate governance review (together with remuneration and 
the position of large, private companies). 
 
7 Richmond Pharmacology Ltd v. Chester Overseas Ltd [2014] EWHC 2692 (Ch) paras 66-68 (Stephen 
Jourdan QC); Re Southern Countries Fresh Foods Ltd [2008] EWHC 2810 (Ch) para. 53 (Mr Justice 
Warren). See also: Deirdre Ahern, Directors’ Duties, Dry Ink and the Accessibility Agenda 128 (Jan) 
Law Quarterly Review 114, 132 (2012). Referring to Re West Coast Capital (Lios) Ltd [2008] CSOH 72, 
Lynch doubts whether s 172 CA will be discussed in courts: ‘it seems that s.172 really is nothing more 
than a restatement of the previous law, and deserves the almost dismissive judicial treatment that it has 
received’: Elaine Lynch, note 6 above. 
8 See Irene-marie Esser et al., ‘Engaging Stakeholders in Corporate Decision-Making through Strategic 
Reporting: An Empirical Study of FTSE 100 Companies’ 29(5) European Business Law Review 729 
(2018). This article provides empirical evidence on compliance with the relevant statutory provisions. It 
sheds light on the manner in which companies consider environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
issues in decision-making and the extent to which disclosure represents an effective strategy for 
engaging stakeholders in that process. In Part 2 (European Business Law Review, 31(2), pp. 209-242.) 
they assess the impact of strategic reporting on stakeholders focusing in particular on the link between 
strategic reporting and engagement by stakeholders in board decision-making by conducting a series 
of interviews. 
9 https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-
promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans. See on this, L Enriques, ‘The Business Roundtable 
CEOs’ Statement: Same old, same old’, 12 September 2019, OBLB. 
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So, when considering the role of stakeholders, the main issue is how can we ensure, through 
the law, that directors focus on long-term interests, act in a sustainable manner and not merely 
focus on short-term goals and profit maximisation. 
 
The recent pandemic puts this into perspective and brings stakeholder interests into direct 
focus.10 This crisis demonstrates which companies have truly embodied the ‘stakeholder 
model’ and which ones have only paid ‘lip-service’ to it. In recent months we have seen 
companies engaging in various activities and initiatives to try to deal with the devastating 
impact of the virus. Some have acted contrary to the ‘normal’ way, where a focus on 
profitmaking and the interests of shareholders is paramount, by focusing on the interests of 
other stakeholders and putting their needs above those of the shareholders. Many companies 
have also suspended share buybacks, scrapped dividends and executives agreed on pay 
reductions (for example, Rolls Royce, Marriott, Goldman Sachs, Delta, Kenya Airways, to 
name a few).11 
 
2.2 A legal response? 
The motivation behind these initiatives and actions is no doubt diverse, perhaps companies 
really do care, or, and this is more realistic, they realise that once the crisis submerges, they 
will be judged on how they dealt with it, i.e. it will have a lasting impact on their reputation. The 
question we need to ask, especially from a legal perspective, is whether this is ‘the new 
normal’, will most companies continue to act in this way, or will we see a move back to 
shareholder primacy and profit maximisation once the crisis settles down? This is important 
as it determines how we address the stakeholder issues, mentioned before, for future 
purposes. 
 
There are potentially three responses to this question: 
1. The current legal position on stakeholder protection is sufficient. When it was 
needed, in a crisis, directors did consider the interests of stakeholders. The 
crisis showed us that companies will step up if it is urgent and required. When 
 
10 See A Kamalnath, ‘Shareholder Primacy in the time of Coronavirus’, OBLB, 7 April 2020 as well as 
‘Corporate Social Responsibility in the times of Covid’, 12 May 2020. See also Cheema-Fox et al, 
‘Corporate Resilience and the Response during COVID-19’, April 2020, Harvard Business School 
Working Paper, No. 20-108; R Bains, ‘Emerging corporate governance considerations for the post-
COVID-19 world’, 12 May 2020, OBLB and a blogpost by R Barker, ‘The new stakeholder governance 
– how coronavirus is changing things for ever’ at https://www.iod.com/news/good-governance-
debate/article/the-corporate-governance-of-coronavirus---stakeholders-centre-stage. 
11 But see also ‘Bumper CEO stock awards dwarf salary sacrifice’, Financial Times 10 June 2020 at 
https://on.ft.com/37nH2f1.  
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it is really needed directors will focus on the long-term, on sustainability. The 
counter argument for this is that the actions of companies are not purely ‘their 
own’, they are backed by Government actions. For example, the UK 
Government’s Self-Employment Income Support Scheme and Coronavirus Job 
Retention Scheme as well as various loan schemes for business.  
2. The law has its place, but it is really ‘collective social action’12 that is the driver 
that brought stakeholder interests into clear focus. Companies responded to 
that pressure, as the cost for not doing this will be too high, especially from a 
reputational perspective. In the end social and market forces, and ‘collective 
social action’ played a key role. This is a valid argument, but one that will only 
work in the context of a crisis, where urgent measures are needed. The 
evidence shows us that companies who followed some kind of stakeholder 
model before the crisis were better equipped to deal with the crisis, e.g., 
Unilever as well as the shipping company Maersk are often mentioned as a 
good examples in this case.13 Companies who already have a business model 
in place where they consider stakeholders, where they look after their 
employees and consumers, for example, are in a better position to continue to 
do that, compared to those who do not have this in place pre-crisis. 
3. Stakeholder interests were brought to the fore during this time of a pandemic, 
but it is hard to imagine that it will stay this way. Companies did not change 
overnight and they will potentially go back to focus on shareholder 
maximisation and shorter term issues. It can even be argued that it will be more 
so, after the crisis than pre-crisis. It will be much harder to focus on the long-
term and be sustainable after a devastating period, financially and with 
potentially much less support from Governments. 
 
Point 3 is the most convincing response and the best approach to follow. We need to be 
ready…. someone recently said ‘there will be a vaccine for COVID-19, but there is not one for 
climate change.14 It is of utmost importance that we continue to look at the protection available 
to stakeholders. We should sufficiently regulate these issues nationally to be able to respond 
globally. We return to this issue in more detail in section 4 below.  
 
3. Without Law – Conduct Regulation in Financial Markets 
 
12 See also here S Gomtsian, ‘When businesses can do good: Lessons from the Coronavirus crisis for 
promoting responsible business practices’, 6 May 2020, OBLB. 
13 See https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/03/covid-19-is-a-litmus-test-for-stakeholder-capitalism/ 
14 See https://impactalpha.com/corporate-sustainability-and-covid-19-three-signs-of-hope-for-a-
brighter-future/. 
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3.1 Context  
The definition of conduct regulation given by the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissioners (IOSCO) provides a useful starting point to delineate the scope of conduct 
regulation:  
‘Those principles of conduct which should govern the activities of financial services firms in 
protecting the interests of their customers and the integrity of the market’.15 
Conduct regulation differs from prudential regulation in that the focus is on relationships with 
individual customers.16 The market integrity objective is focused on ensuring confidence in the 
operation of markets, encompassing in particular freedom from market manipulation and 
insider trading. In some systems, such as the so-called ‘twin peaks’ system in the UK, conduct 
regulation is undertaken by a separate regulator, whereas in others a single or multiple 
regulator may be involved. And the regulatory remit may extend beyond the IOSCO definition 
by including additional objectives, such as the promotion of competition in the UK system.17    
 
3.2 EU dimensions 
The EU framework for conduct regulation has been the key driver of the evolution of conduct 
regulation in the UK in recent times and that influence will persist even after Brexit, as EU law 
will be preserved when the transitional period linked to the UK’s withdrawal ends on the 31st 
December 2020.18 Thus, the UK regime can only be understood by reference to some key 
aspects of the EU framework.   
 
Harmonization 
The framework for conduct regulation in the EU has been the subject of considerable 
harmonization over time, with the result that there is a substantial body of common rules 
operating across the EU. In some instances (e.g. insurance) the process has been in the form 
of minimum harmonization (leaving member states the option of imposing higher standards 
through ‘gold-plating’), whereas in others (e.g. the MiFID regime for investment services19) the 
process has been one of maximum harmonization, leaving member states with little or no 
scope to adjust or expand the EU rules.   
 
15 See IOSCO, International Conduct of Business Principles (1990) at 
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD8.pdf.  
16 For a general overview see Andrew F. Tuch, Conduct of Business Regulation, Chapter 18 in N. 
Moloney, E. Ferran and J. Payne (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (OUP 2015).  
17 For the statutory objectives of the UK conduct regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), see 
The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (c. 8) s1B-s1E.  
18 See further House of Lords, EU Financial Affairs Sub-Committee, Corrected Oral Evidence: Financial 
Services After Brexit, Witnesses Prof Niamh Moloney, London School of Economics, Prof David Miles, 
Imperial College London, available at https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/64/pdf/.  
19 See for a general overview https://www.esma.europa.eu/policy-rules/mifid-ii-and-mifir.  
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Sectoral regimes  
There is no single regime for conduct regulation across financial services in the EU. Instead 
there are a number of regimes which cover sectors, and in some cases just a single financial 
product (e.g. mortgages or payments). And while there are similarities between these regimes, 
there are also important differences, with the result that financial products with similar 
functions can be subject to different conduct regimes.20  
 
ESAs and ‘single rule book’ 
The establishment of three sectoral European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) in 2011 was 
intended to facilitate a more consistent approach to supervision of financial firms through the 
creation of a so-called ‘single rule book’, combining the different levels of regulatory rules with 
guidance from the ESAs.21 But, in contrast with the banking sector, there was no significant 
shift of supervision from national authorities to the ESAs in the case of investment and 
insurance.  
 
Enforcement and NCAs 
Moreover, even with the introduction of the ESAs, enforcement of conduct regulation remained 
the responsibility of the national competent authorities (NCAs) of the member states in which 
business in conducted.22 Thus, in contrast with prudential supervision, where financial firms 
would typically be supervised by a single regulator, there may be many different NCAs 
involved in conduct regulation.  
 
3.3 Emerging Trends in Conduct Regulation  
In order to understand the context of the regulatory response to the pandemic and to evaluate 
its potential influence for the future, it is useful to identify some of the key trends that have 
been evident in conduct regulation since the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008.  
 
Principles vs rules  
 
20 See further V. Colaert, D. Busch and T. Incalza, European Financial Regulation, Levelling the Cross-
Sectoral Playing Field (Hart Publishing 2019).  
21 See further Iain MacNeil, ‘All Change in Europe’, Editorial, 5(2) Law and Financial Markets Review 
(March 2011).   
22 See further Iain MacNeil, Enforcement and Sanctioning, chapter 10 (part 4) in N. Moloney et al (eds) 
(n16).  
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The issue of principles vs rules is something of an old chestnut in regulatory discourse.23 But 
is has retained its relevance in the post-GFC world, in particular in the UK. The more assertive 
enforcement stance adopted by the FCA following the GFC relied substantially on the capacity 
of principles to be enforced independently, without reliance on underlying rules.24 That 
enabled principles to be used to mitigate the inherently more limited scope of detailed rules 
and to trump the sort of ‘box-ticking’ compliance often associated with such rules.  
 
Culture and Ethics 
One of the key developments in the wake of the GFC was a realization that more regulatory 
rules would not necessarily provide a good solution, especially as the sharp rise in misconduct 
claims and penalties indicated that the existing rules were not very effective. And while the 
rate of production of conduct regulation has not declined since the GFC (more likely the 
opposite), it is noticeable that regulators (both prudential and conduct) have focused on the 
importance of culture and ethics as drivers of good conduct.25 That change in approach can 
be interpreted in different ways, but it is at least credible to suggest that it may be linked with 
a recognition that there are limits to what can be achieved through regulatory rules, with the 
result that some experimentation with alternative techniques is required. Linked to that is the 
possibility that the focus on culture and ethics may represent a simplification strategy for a 
system that has become overly complex, by providing a proxy for organizational values and 
practices that lead to good outcomes.  
 
Expanding disclosure  
Disclosure is widely regarded as a sine qua non for informed decision-making by investors, 
thereby supporting the price formation and capital allocation functions of markets and 
providing effective protection for consumers. But the process of setting appropriate disclosure 
standards remains largely trial and error, especially in the case of retail investors where the 
national contexts and market practices may vary considerably. Post-GFC, it seems that there 
has been expansion in disclosure obligations, especially in the context of investment services 
provided to retail clients, but also in the context of stock exchanges, where non-financial 
 
23 Principles-based regulation had risen in prominence and prestige before the GFC, largely as a result 
of its adoption in the UK. See further Julia Black, Martyn Hopper and Christa Bland, ‘Making a Success 
of Principles Based Regulation’, 1(3) Law and Financial Markets Review 191-206 (May 2007).  
24 This approach has been endorsed by the courts – see R (ex parte British Bankers Association) v FSA 
[2011] EWHC 999 (Admin) at para 161 (Ousely J). That decision underpinned the FSA’s requirement 
for firms to compensate customers for the mis-selling of payment protection insurance (PPI).  
25 See e.g. FCA DP 20/1, Transforming culture in financial services – driving purposeful cultures (5th 
March 2020), available at https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/discussion-papers/dp20-1-transforming-
culture-financial-services-driving-purposeful-cultures.  
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information linked to environmental, social and governance issues has come to the fore.26 
What is less clear, especially in the retail sector, is whether expanding disclosure has or can 
deliver better decision-making and outcomes. 
 
3.4 The Pandemic Response – Interventions  
There have been a wide range of interventions at the EU and UK level in response to the 
pandemic. We focus on the most significant, encompassing both the professional and retail 
markets.  
 
Mortgages 
The FCA issued guidance in March instructing mortgage lenders to provide a 3-month 
payment holiday where a customer is experiencing or reasonably expects to 
experience payment difficulties as a result of circumstances relating to coronavirus.27 The 
guidance was updated in May28, providing that where a customer indicates they cannot 
immediately resume full payments, firms should offer them a further full or partial payment 
deferral for 3 monthly payments, based on what the customer considers they can currently 
afford to repay.  
 
The European Banking Authority also issued a statement29, in less explicit terms than the 
FCA, calling on lenders to act in the interests of consumers, and regulators in various EU 
countries have followed up with more specific measures.  
 
Pre-emption rights 
Pre-emption rights ensure that equity shareholders are protected against dilution of their 
proportionate shareholding when new share issues take place. The principle is a key element 
of UK and EU corporate law, albeit that other capital markets (such as the US) seem to operate 
quite well without it. The FCA Policy Statement follows that of the Pre-Emption Group, which 
 
26 See generally Esser et al (n8).  
27 See FCA, Mortgages and coronavirus: our guidance for firms (20th March 2020), available at 
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/mortgages-coronavirus-guidance-firms.   
28 See FCA, Mortgages and coronavirus: updated guidance for firms (22nd May 2020), available at 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/guidance-consultations/mortgages-coronavirus-updated-draft-
guidance-firms.  
29 See EBA, Statement on consumer and payment issues in light of COVID 19 (25th March 2020), 
available at https://eba.europa.eu/eba-provides-clarity-banks-consumers-application-prudential-
framework-light-covid-19-measures.  
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recommends that shareholders support share issues without pre-emption rights up to 20% of 
share capital (compared with the standard authorisation of only 5%).30 
 
Disclosure 
The FCA relaxation31 in the UK relates to the requirement to publish a statement of working 
capital in connection with capital raising via a prospectus. It allows issuers to disclose in an 
unqualified working capital statement their key assumptions in relation to business disruption 
during the coronavirus crisis underpinning the ’reasonable worst-case scenario’ that must be 
modelled in support of the working capital statement. The revised approach permits such 
assumptions to be disclosed without requiring the inclusion of a qualified working capital 
statement.  
 
Financial Reports and General Meetings of Shareholders  
The FCA has temporarily relaxed the normal rules on publication of annual and interim reports 
and the holding of general meetings of shareholders, both of which are fundamental aspects 
of the accountability regime for boards of directors.32 
 
In the case of annual reports, listed companies are permitted 6 months (instead of 4) from 
their financial year end to publish the report. For interim reports the permitted deferral is one 
month. A similar approach has been adopted by ESMA at the EU level.  
 
Shareholder approval is required under the UK Listing Rules for Class 1 transactions (major 
transactions) and related party transactions. Normally, a shareholders meeting is required to 
give approval, but that requirement can now be the subject of an individual dispensation from 
the FCA if the issuer can show that they would have the support of the relevant proportion of 
shareholders. This is in addition to the proposed relaxation of company law permitting online 
rather than in-person general meetings.33  
 
3.5 Rationale and legal basis  
While the rationale for all these interventions can be linked to the need to respond to the crisis, 
the legal basis for FCA action provides an illuminating perspective. None of the actions 
 
30 See FCA, Listed companies and recapitalisation issues during the coronavirus crisis (8th April 2020), 
available at https://www.fca.org.uk/news/statements/listed-companies-recapitalisation-issuances-
coronavirus.  
31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid.  
33 See the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill 2019-21 at 
https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2019-21/corporateinsolvencyandgovernance.html.  
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represent a formal exercise of rule-making powers. The mortgage intervention takes the form 
of guidance, which cannot impose obligations, but may be relevant for the regulator deciding 
to take enforcement action and for the interpretation of principles if such action is taken. 
Moreover, and contrary to normal practice, the guidance has the effect of disrupting private 
law obligations.  The pre-emption statement is really just endorsement of the recommendation 
of an influential shareholder body. In the case of annual reports and general meetings, the 
intervention is in the form of a Statement of Practice, which in effect provides a safe-harbour 
to firms from enforcement action.  
 
In contrast with prudential regulation (where the counter cyclical buffer is designed to be 
adjustable by the Financial Policy Committee), conduct regulation lacks explicit provision for 
general adjustment of rules by reference to changes in market context (waivers of rules are 
possible only for firms on application). Thus, interventions are ad hoc, and are framed without 
the benefit of an ex ante framework for crisis management. While some commentators see 
that as problematic in terms both of the nature of interventions and the process for agreeing 
action between multiple regulators,34 others point to the need to subordinate considerations 
of formal legal process and accountability in crisis situations.35    
 
4 Evaluation  
 
We conclude by evaluating what these different outcomes tell us about the future trajectory of 
development and the role of law.  
 
4.1 Stakeholder Interests 
The adaptation in corporate governance practice evident during the pandemic to elevate 
stakeholder interests suggest that instead of trying to reform the law we should focus on 
options already in place. These include section 172, which enables directors to perform a 
balancing act between long-term interests and short-term considerations, detailed non-
financial reporting requirements and, finally, mechanisms to ensure stakeholder participation 
and engagement. It is perhaps the last where we can do more and ensure that stakeholders 
are not merely informed, but engaged in the decision-making process, on board level. In 
 
34 See Chiu, Iris H-Y and Kokkinis, Andreas and Miglionico, Andrea, ‘Regulatory Suspensions in Times 
of Crisis: The Challenges of Covid-19 and Thoughts for the Future’ (May 19, 2020) European Corporate 
Governance Institute - Law Working Paper No. 517/2020. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3605423 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3605423. 
35 See Wolf-Georg Ringe, Covid-19, No Time for Lawyers, OBLB Blogpost 22nd May 2020, available at 
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2020/05/covid-19-no-time-lawyers.  
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previous research36 we have suggested combining an advisory stakeholder panel (including 
representation of the workforce, as recommended in the CGC) and a designated non-
executive director (NED) representing all stakeholders.37 The stakeholder panel could meet 
outside the board and report to the board through a designated NED. The biggest challenge 
with regard to the suggested stakeholder panel concerns setting out an effective mechanism 
to determine the composition of the panel and the representation of the interests of all 
stakeholders. The South African social and ethics committee (SEC) can be used as an 
example in this context. It creates a statutory solution and could be applied with adjustments 
to the UK. In brief, based on s 72 of the South African Companies Act 2008 (read with 
Companies Regulation 43) every state owned company, every listed public company and any 
other company that has, in any two of the previous five years, had a public interest score of at 
least 500 points (the number of employees and the turnover are some of the factors that will 
determine if a company is obliged to have such a committee) must appoint an SEC. The aim 
of this Committee is to draw certain matters to the attention of the board and to then report to 
the shareholders. These matters include social and economic development, good corporate 
citizenship, the environment, health and public safety, consumer relationships, labour and 
employment. This committee is dealt with in legislation in South Africa, but a similar committee 
could be provided for in the UK Companies Act as part of the current section 414. It would 
make sense if this committee is mandatory. The same sample of companies that have to 
produce a strategic report should also have such a committee in place. The UK is 
characterised by a flexible system that operates on a “comply or explain” basis but we are of 
the view that this would not be sufficient in this context. We argued before that there is no 
mechanism for market discipline available to stakeholders analogous to the selling option 
available to shareholders. A mandatory committee, considering ESG issues, will provide a 
level-playing field for stakeholder engagement. 
 
A recent study38 on this committee, in South Africa, revealed that most companies that took 
part in the study admit that their social and ethics committees are in the early stages of 
 
36 Esser, I.-M. and MacNeil I, ‘Disclosure and engagement: stakeholder participation 
mechanisms’. European Business Law Review, 30(2), pp. 201-221. 
37 Libson underlines the role of a designated board sub-committee in pursuing ESG goals. He states 
that a corporation’s decisions that have a significant impact on social matters, such as environmental 
implications, should be delegated to shareholders to approve. Importantly, one of the options for 
achieving this goal is the top-down form that establishes an independent sub-committee on the board 
that identifies significant social issues and delegates decisions on such issues to shareholders. Adi 
Libson, Taking shareholders’ social preferences seriously: Confronting a new agency problem Bar Ilan 
University Faculty of Law Research paper no 18-18 (2018) https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3226767.   
38 See the EY survey on the impact of the social and ethics committee, 3 years after its incorporation in 
its Trialogue Annual Sustainability Review available at 
https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-the-status-of-social-and-ethics-committees-a-
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development and they expect their mandates to be refined; to develop a deeper understanding 
of the issues and their strategic importance and to have the composition adjusted, with a 
greater focus on independence. Respondents also expressed interest in strengthening their 
management systems with improved performance dashboards and data quality. These are 
factors to keep in mind when considering a similar structure. However, the committee is 
uniquely placed, with direct access to the main board and a mandate to reach into the depths 
of the business. As a result, it is capable of having a strong influence on the way a company 
heads down the path of sustained value creation.39 
 
4.2 Conduct of business regulation 
What do the pandemic interventions tell us about the future of conduct regulation? In order to 
make that assessment, let’s return to the three emerging trends in conduct regulation identified 
earlier.  
 
Principles vs rules  
Tolerance for ad hoc interventions, based on high level principles, may indicate better 
acceptance of principles by regulated firms, investors and consumers. The complexity of the 
conduct regulation system has been driven in part by firms calling for more legal certainty and 
a perception that more granular rules deliver better consumer protection. A less complex 
system would be a step forward.40  
 
Culture and Ethics 
Interventions have not relied on the formal legal process associated with regulatory rule-
making (which would trigger consultation and cost-benefit analysis). This may be linked with 
the idea that legal techniques have reached their limit in terms of driving higher standards of 
conduct. There is some evidence that ethical standards have been mobilised by the crisis, 
moving from the poor relation of hard regulatory rules to play a more instrumental role in 
 
trialogue-ey-survey/$FILE/EY-the-status-of-social-and-ethics-committees-a-trialogue-ey-survey.pdf. 
The study looked at 12 listed companies, employing around 14 000 employees. Challenges include 
clarifying the committee mandate, securing top-level buy-in, ensuring strategic alignment and 
navigating a challenging and diverse set of issues. Successes include raising the profile of sustainability 
issues and ensuring decision makers appreciate their strategic value and identifying critical non-
financial issues and formalising a response. 
39 See IM Esser, Chapter 4: ‘Regulating ESG Issues: A comparison of South Africa and the United 
Kingdom’ in Hermie Coetzee and Carika Fritz (eds), De Serie Legenda, Developments in Commercial 
Law, Entrepreneurial Law (Volume III), LexisNexis, Durban (2019). 
40 See further I MacNeil, ‘Rethinking Conduct Regulation’, 30 (7) Butterworths Journal of International 
Banking and Financial Law (2015) 413-420.  
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conduct regulation.41 That may well encourage regulators to continue with their initiative to 
position culture and ethics more centrally in the framework of conduct regulation.    
 
Expanding disclosure  
While regulators have been keen to stress that disclosure obligations generally remain in place 
during the crisis, the interventions serve as a reminder that disclosure and transparency are 
not unqualified public goods. There are trade-offs to be considered in terms of the costs and 
benefits of disclosure, including behavioural limitations on informed decision-making. 
Moreover, if it is true that ethical standards are now more prominent, there is a case for 
reconsidering the protective role of disclosure for consumers as part of the consultation on 
MiFID II that is currently underway in the EU.42  
 
From a broader perspective, setting an appropriate framework for conduct regulation will be a 
key factor for re-invigorating the stalled Capital Markets Union project in Europe43, particularly 
after the departure of the UK, where market-based finance has been more prominent. This is 
relevant both for issuers and investors and encompasses the design and distribution of 
potential new financial instruments that could respond to the pandemic.44 
 
5 Conclusions  
 
We note that formal legal change has not featured prominently in the UK response to the 
pandemic albeit that some interventions (such as mortgage holidays) have de facto adjusted 
pre-existing legal rights and duties. The reasons for this outcome differ between the two 
scenarios that we investigated. In the case of stakeholders’ interests, the flexible nature of the 
legal standard represented by directors’ duties facilitated an elevation in the significance of 
stakeholders’ interests in response to social pressure. Nevertheless, we conclude that without 
 
41 This is implicit in the reliance of the FCA pandemic response in the UK on high-level principles which 
are linked much more closely to ethical principles than detailed rules. See further MacNeil (n40) at 417.  
42 See EU Commission, Review of the regulatory framework for investment firms and market operators, 
(February 2020), available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-
say/initiatives/12167-Review-of-the-regulatory-framework-for-investment-firms-and-market-operators-
MiFID-2-1-/public-consultation.  
43 See e.g. Ecofin Discussion Paper, Capital markets union – reboot: a policy discussion on the future 
of the capital markets union, (September 2019) available at 
https://eu2019.fi/documents/11707387/15400298/CMU+Reboot+Informal+ECOFIN+final+Issues+Not
e+2019-09-09_S4.pdf/05142af6-25f0-74d0-7d2a-
7eb68a2bcb39/CMU+Reboot+Informal+ECOFIN+final+Issues+Note+2019-09-09_S4.pdf.  
44 See Anne Richards, CEO Fidelity International, Public equity markets are flagging when we need 
them most, Financial Times, June 3 2020, available at  https://www.ft.com/content/1a9dddc1-d52b-
4fc0-afef-01bbc3b55195.  
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more effective progress on an effective mechanism to integrate stakeholder interests into 
board decision-making, the pandemic response is unlikely to have lasting impact. Moreover, 
we are sceptical with regard to the use of the ‘comply or explain’ technique for any such 
mechanism as the conditions that make the technique effective in the context of corporate 
governance codes would be absent. In the case of conduct of business regulation, the 
structure of regulation in the UK facilitated a response largely without resort to formal rule-
making.  We surmise that this outcome can be read, at least in part, as linked to an emerging 
trend away from detailed rules in favour of alternative metrics of good conduct, which might 
also justify a less prominent role for disclosure as a form of consumer protection.  
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